Prabowo Gathers Gerindra Cadres in Hambalang, Dasco and KDM Attend
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This article was translated by AI. Read the original article on Kompas.com. See Original
In conventional bribery, the actor violates rules to influence decisions. In state capture, interested actors influence the rules to ensure that state decisions benefit them.
The law risks losing its function as a boundary for power and transforms into an instrument of legitimization.
We have experienced this. The debate over the revision of the 2019 KPK Law, for instance, illustrates how changes in institutional design can spark sharp differences in views regarding independence and effectiveness.
Supporters emphasize structuring and accountability, while critics worry about the weakening of independence.
This debate does not prove criminality or state capture, but reminds us of the importance of testing every legal change against its impact on the restriction of power.
Thus, the question in the formation of law is not merely whether the procedures have been fulfilled but whether the law strengthens public interest and maintains power balance.
Political corruption differs characteristically from ordinary bureaucratic corruption. It arises from relationships between political financing, distribution of positions, and access to economic resources.
When political financing is not transparent, positions and policies risk becoming tools for returning political investments.
Robert Klitgaard in Controlling Corruption (1988) reminds us that corruption grows when there is a monopoly of power and wide discretion without accountability.
Susan Rose-Ackerman in Corruption and Government (1999) emphasizes the importance of incentive and institutional design.
The electronic ID card case serves as a harsh lesson on how high-value procurements involve relationships among political actors, bureaucracy, and business.
Licensing and natural resource issues also highlight the significant risks when government decisions dictate access to economic benefits.
These cases should not generalize that all politics is corrupt but reinforce that prevention must target the structure of relationships among political power, bureaucracy, and economics.
Article 1 paragraph (3) of the 1945 Constitution asserts that Indonesia is a state governed by law. This means that power must not only have a formal basis but also must be subject to limitations, equality before the law, and accountability.
Lawrence Friedman explains that law operates through structure, substance, and legal culture. When oversight structures are weak, substance opens the door to conflicts of interest, and the culture tolerates deviations, the law loses its power to control.