Prabowo Gathers Gerindra Cadres in Hambalang, Dasco and KDM Attend
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This article was translated by AI. Read the original article on Kompas.com. See Original
THE GOVERNMENT'S PLAN to review the definition of corruption is indeed urgent. Ideally progressive, it should not stall in narrow debates about whether or not there is state loss.
This redefinition should be a participatory legislative effort to respond to a painful fact: our Corruption Perception Index is declining, as is our Rule of Law Index.
The World Justice Project's Rule of Law Index 2026 ranks Indonesia 75th out of 143 countries, down six places from the previous year. Its score dropped from 0.52 to 0.51.
More concerning figures are present within that data. The criminal justice score is only 0.37, absence of corruption stands at 0.42, the civil justice score is 0.44, and fundamental rights score is 0.45.
Transparency International's 2025 Corruption Perception Index also fell, from a score of 37 to 34, ranking Indonesia 109th out of 182 countries.
While these two indices employ different methodologies and cannot be concluded as having a direct cause-and-effect relationship, they both send a similar warning: the integrity of our governance and the quality of our justice are in trouble.
Why is a country with extensive legal tools and anti-corruption institutions still unable to build a stronger rule of law?
The likely answer is that our understanding of corruption has not kept pace with the evolving ways that power is abused.
Corruption does not always start from hands that embezzle state funds. Often, it begins with power crafting rules to protect its own interests.
Political decisions being traded, public policies hijacked by networks of power and economy. In this form, corruption not only violates the law but also undermines the very purpose of the law.
This is the face of modern corruption that demands we redefine it. Corruption should not be understood merely as a financial crime. It must be viewed as a deviation of the mandate of power that threatens justice, democracy, and constitutional integrity.
The biggest challenge today is what we call legal corruption. This term does not imply that corruption is legally justified; it describes the abuse of influence and decision-making processes to gain undue advantages through actions that may not necessarily violate criminal law.
Formal legality does not always reflect substantive integrity. A policy can pass all official procedures but remains problematic if the process is controlled by hidden conflicts of interest or grants undue advantages to those with political access.
Hellman, Jones, and Kaufmann explain state capture in their work, Seize the State, Seize the Day (2000).
Corruption no longer occurs when someone breaks the rules. A more fundamental risk emerges when the regulatory formation process itself is hijacked.
In conventional bribery, the actor violates rules to influence decisions. In state capture, interested actors influence the rules to ensure that state decisions benefit them.
The law risks losing its function as a boundary for power and transforms into an instrument of legitimization.
We have experienced this. The debate over the revision of the 2019 KPK Law, for instance, illustrates how changes in institutional design can spark sharp differences in views regarding independence and effectiveness.
Supporters emphasize structuring and accountability, while critics worry about the weakening of independence.
This debate does not prove criminality or state capture, but reminds us of the importance of testing every legal change against its impact on the restriction of power.
Thus, the question in the formation of law is not merely whether the procedures have been fulfilled but whether the law strengthens public interest and maintains power balance.
Political corruption differs characteristically from ordinary bureaucratic corruption. It arises from relationships between political financing, distribution of positions, and access to economic resources.
When political financing is not transparent, positions and policies risk becoming tools for returning political investments.
Robert Klitgaard in Controlling Corruption (1988) reminds us that corruption grows when there is a monopoly of power and wide discretion without accountability.
Susan Rose-Ackerman in Corruption and Government (1999) emphasizes the importance of incentive and institutional design.
The electronic ID card case serves as a harsh lesson on how high-value procurements involve relationships among political actors, bureaucracy, and business.
Licensing and natural resource issues also highlight the significant risks when government decisions dictate access to economic benefits.
These cases should not generalize that all politics is corrupt but reinforce that prevention must target the structure of relationships among political power, bureaucracy, and economics.
Article 1 paragraph (3) of the 1945 Constitution asserts that Indonesia is a state governed by law. This means that power must not only have a formal basis but also must be subject to limitations, equality before the law, and accountability.
Lawrence Friedman explains that law operates through structure, substance, and legal culture. When oversight structures are weak, substance opens the door to conflicts of interest, and the culture tolerates deviations, the law loses its power to control.
This is the difference between rule by law and rule of law. In rule by law, the law is used as an instrument of power.
In rule of law, the law instead limits, tests, and corrects power. A law-governed state is not one that merely has laws, but one that ensures no one, including the highest powers, is above the law.
The criminal justice score of 0.37 is a wake-up call for a total overhaul of the justice system, from police, prosecutors, courts, to corrections. Misuse of discretion, conflicts of interest, interference in cases, and preferential treatment must be controlled.
Specifically for the police, the professionalism of investigations must be accompanied by effective oversight, transparency of cases, and protection of citizen rights.
Both internal and external supervision are not threats to authority; in fact, they are sources of authority because they ensure that power is accounted for objectively.
This redefinition must be translated into three agendas.
First, reinforce criminal acts while controlling policy corruption. Enforcement should remain strict for those who meet criminal elements, but oversight must also reach conflicts of interest, influence trading, and hijacking of policy processes.
Not all deviations must be criminalized; some require administrative and ethical corrections.
Second, institutionalize constitutional ethics. Ethics should not merely be moral advice; it must be a duty to disclose conflicts of interest, transparency in official relationships with stakeholders, and merit-based appointments.
Third, build reforms based on measurable indicators. The government needs to focus on the weakest factors in the WJP, with targets, accountability, and periodic public evaluations, including transparency in political financing and high-risk sectors like procurement and licensing.
The most dangerous type of corruption is not the one that steals state wealth, but one that robs the state of its ability to enforce justice.
When the law is hijacked by power, justice loses its protector. When power submits to law and constitutional ethics, the rule of law regains its dignity.