Military and Civilian at the Border: Testing Synergy, Not Blurring Mandates

Meanwhile, technical ministries and local governments continue to exercise their sectoral authorities, including in public services, infrastructure development, and economic planning.

BNPPDT plays a role in coordinating planning, budget needs, execution, and evaluation of border management in line with its mandate.

Collaboration should not necessitate all institutions losing their identities and responsibilities.

The legal framework in Indonesia provides an important foundation for this division. Law No. 43 of 2008 on State Territories governs the management of state areas, institutional frameworks, authority, and the involvement of the public.

Meanwhile, Law No. 3 of 2025 amends certain provisions in Law No. 34 of 2004 on the TNI, including regarding the duties and placement of personnel in ministries or agencies.

These stipulations need to be read carefully alongside relevant implementing regulations and legal bases for assignments.

The appointment of a military officer as head of an agency does not automatically mean that all technical authorities of that agency are transferred to the TNI.

This legal certainty is not merely a bureaucratic formality. On the contrary, clear authorities can prevent command conflicts, activity duplication, and uncertainty about who is responsible when a program fails to meet its objectives.

Without a measured division of roles, each institution may feel it has fulfilled its duties while issues on the ground remain unaddressed.

Conversely, when mandates, resources, and responsibilities are clearly articulated, inter-agency work becomes easier to evaluate.

The “principal-agent” theory in public administration helps clarify this issue. In this relationship, policymakers mandate implementing institutions to carry out their objectives.

Problems arise when information is imbalanced, interests differ, or responsibilities are not clearly articulated.

In border management, the presence of many implementers can create a situation where no one feels responsible for the final outcomes.

Thus, every priority program needs a clearly defined responsible individual, written division of tasks, performance indicators, and reporting mechanisms.

An institutional approach also reminds us that coordination cannot be established solely through leadership directives.

Each organization has different rules, procedures, work cultures, and budgetary systems.

James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, in their institutional studies, illustrate the importance of rules and organizational routines in shaping institutional behavior.

In the border context, these procedural differences may hinder policy execution even if all parties express support for the same goals.

Therefore, synergy requires joint working procedures, legitimate data exchanges, and agreed-upon problem-solving mechanisms.

The first step needed is to draft a cross-agency authority matrix. This document should clarify who sets policies, who carries out technical activities, who provides operational support, and who oversees outcomes.