Military and Civilian at the Border: Testing Synergy, Not Blurring Mandates

MANAGING borders is not just about maintaining territorial lines; it also involves coordinating dozens of institutions with different mandates, resources, and operational methods.

In hard-to-reach areas, national success depends on the ability of defense personnel, technical ministries, local governments, and public service agencies to work together seamlessly.

However, as more institutions are involved, the need for clear authority, shared responsibilities, and accountability for every decision also increases.

The appointment of TNI General Maruli Simanjuntak as Deputy Commander of the TNI and head of the National Border Management and Remote Areas Agency (BNPPDT) on 15 October 2026, presents a moment to test this governance design.

This assignment comes at a time when the government is expanding its focus on border and remote area management.

The strategic question is not whether the military or civilians should lead, but how to combine their capacities without blurring institutional mandates and principles of governmental accountability.

The need for coordination is no small matter. In discussions by the Working Committee of Commission II of the DPR in January 2026, there was a push for the BNPP to draft a roadmap for border management involving around 40 ministries and agencies, as well as governors in border regions.

This discussion also highlighted the necessity to sharpen authorities, strengthen budgetary support, and establish cross-institution control mechanisms to prevent program overlaps.

This fact demonstrates that fundamental challenges are not merely about a lack of institutions but about how to unify the work of various institutions within a single accountability framework.

In this context, the involvement of the TNI provides numerous opportunities. The military organization possesses experience in logistics management, communication, mobility, and operations in challenging terrains.

This capability can assist in task execution in areas that face transportation access or supporting infrastructure limitations.

In certain situations, military personnel and resources can also enhance responses to security disturbances and emergencies, as long as this is executed in accordance with mandates and applicable legal provisions.

However, operational capacity does not equate to governmental authority. The ability to mobilize resources quickly doesn't automatically mean that an institution is best suited to make decisions regarding all aspects of development, trade, population administration, or public services.

Each field has its own legal basis, technical standards, and oversight mechanisms.

Thus, the benefits of synergy depend on the ability to distinguish supporting functions from the authority that must remain under the purview of the legitimate institution.

This is where Samuel P. Huntington's theory of civil-military relations becomes relevant. In “The Soldier and the State”, Huntington emphasizes the importance of military professionalism and the regulation of relationships between defense institutions and civilian political authorities.

This perspective helps explain that military capabilities can be harnessed for the state's benefit without turning all governance issues into military affairs.

Professionalism encompasses not only operational skills but also an understanding of mandates, task limits, and institutional relationships.

In border governance, this principle needs to translate into clear role divisions.

The TNI carries out defense duties and provides support in accordance with the legal basis and specified needs.

Meanwhile, technical ministries and local governments continue to exercise their sectoral authorities, including in public services, infrastructure development, and economic planning.

BNPPDT plays a role in coordinating planning, budget needs, execution, and evaluation of border management in line with its mandate.

Collaboration should not necessitate all institutions losing their identities and responsibilities.

The legal framework in Indonesia provides an important foundation for this division. Law No. 43 of 2008 on State Territories governs the management of state areas, institutional frameworks, authority, and the involvement of the public.

Meanwhile, Law No. 3 of 2025 amends certain provisions in Law No. 34 of 2004 on the TNI, including regarding the duties and placement of personnel in ministries or agencies.

These stipulations need to be read carefully alongside relevant implementing regulations and legal bases for assignments.

The appointment of a military officer as head of an agency does not automatically mean that all technical authorities of that agency are transferred to the TNI.

This legal certainty is not merely a bureaucratic formality. On the contrary, clear authorities can prevent command conflicts, activity duplication, and uncertainty about who is responsible when a program fails to meet its objectives.

Without a measured division of roles, each institution may feel it has fulfilled its duties while issues on the ground remain unaddressed.

Conversely, when mandates, resources, and responsibilities are clearly articulated, inter-agency work becomes easier to evaluate.

The “principal-agent” theory in public administration helps clarify this issue. In this relationship, policymakers mandate implementing institutions to carry out their objectives.

Problems arise when information is imbalanced, interests differ, or responsibilities are not clearly articulated.

In border management, the presence of many implementers can create a situation where no one feels responsible for the final outcomes.

Thus, every priority program needs a clearly defined responsible individual, written division of tasks, performance indicators, and reporting mechanisms.

An institutional approach also reminds us that coordination cannot be established solely through leadership directives.

Each organization has different rules, procedures, work cultures, and budgetary systems.

James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, in their institutional studies, illustrate the importance of rules and organizational routines in shaping institutional behavior.

In the border context, these procedural differences may hinder policy execution even if all parties express support for the same goals.

Therefore, synergy requires joint working procedures, legitimate data exchanges, and agreed-upon problem-solving mechanisms.

The first step needed is to draft a cross-agency authority matrix. This document should clarify who sets policies, who carries out technical activities, who provides operational support, and who oversees outcomes.

Each program should also have sources of funding, implementation schedules, and escalation paths when obstacles arise.

This way, coordination should not stop at meetings and agreements but become a mechanism for resolving traceable issues.

The second step is to build a results-based evaluation system. Success should not be measured merely by the number of joint activities, frequency of meetings, or the extent of budget utilization.

Evaluations must assess whether programs are on schedule, whether cross-institutional obstacles have been resolved, whether facilities function, and whether public services improve.

Simultaneously, collective assessments must not obliterate individual accountability. Each institution must still clarify the execution of duties within its authority.

The “whole-of-government” approach offers a relevant framework. Policies involving multiple sectors require shared objectives, inter-organizational coordination, and interconnected performance measures.

However, integration does not mean that all authority is merged into a single agency. Instead, effective coordination allows each institution to exercise its competencies while not overlooking the impact of decisions on other institutions.

For the BNPPDT, its strategic role lies in ensuring that planning, budgeting, execution, and evaluation move in the same direction.

Ultimately, the success of civil-military synergy should be assessed by the quality of governance, not by the identity of the institution leading.

The TNI can make significant contributions through its defense and operational capabilities, while civil institutions continue to execute administrative and technical mandates in accordance with legal statutes.

Both can mutually reinforce each other when their responsibilities are clear, oversight mechanisms function, and their outputs can be verified.

The assignment of TNI General Maruli Simanjuntak in the BNPPDT presents an opportunity to improve coordination in border management.

However, changes in leadership will only matter if accompanied by improved operational rules, clearly defined responsibilities, and consistent evaluation systems.

The state does not need institutions that usurp functions from one another, but rather institutions that understand their mandates and can work together to achieve national goals.

Effective synergy is not about erasing boundaries of authority but about clearly understanding those boundaries so that collaboration can happen more effectively.

In border management, legal certainty and accountability are not obstacles to speed. Instead, they form the foundation for ensuring that state power can be utilized accurately, professionally, and sustainably.

If at the borders all institutions want to be commanders and no one wants to be the recorder, then what is lost is not just the budget, but accountability.

The strength of civil-military synergy is not measured by how many uniforms are visible in PLBN, but by how clear it is about who needs correction when roads remain bumpy, schools remain empty, and signals remain weak.