When the Baduy Settlement Ignited in Flames...
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This article was translated by AI. Read the original article on Kompas.com. See Original
Nevertheless, Sultan Baktiar Najamudin's concerns regarding development imbalances between the center and regions in western, central, and eastern Indonesia should be interpreted as a valid sociological aspiration for justice.
In contemporary legal and institutional thought, British constitutional jurist Albert Venn Dicey, through his work Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (1885), emphasizes that the rule of law and clarity in the division of institutional authority demand mechanisms that are orderly and measurable—not merely adding new official positions without clear boundaries of power.
When viewed through the lens of governance, the issues of development disparities and weak oversight of regional heads are not primarily due to an insufficient number of vice presidents but stem from the yet-optimized functional oversight instruments and the enforcement of integrity in law.
The irony becomes more pronounced amidst challenges to the State Ministry Law, which is contested to streamline government architecture and curb the bloating of the state budget, that discussions arise about adding vice presidents up to three, potentially creating new problems.
The challenge to the State Ministry Law arises from public concern over a bloated cabinet that burdens the state budget and hampers inter-ministerial coordination, leading to the perception that institutional streamlining is a rational step to maintain fiscal efficiency.
Instead of addressing the needs for efficiency and orderly bureaucracy, the discourse around adding vice presidential seats at the executive summit risks opening new state expenditure posts, extending coordination chains, and complicating the institutional framework.
Increasing the number of high officials at the executive peak as a shortcut to supervise regional heads is a form of "over-institutionalization" that ignores the root problems—namely, strengthening the oversight functions of the Ministry of Home Affairs, internal government oversight apparatus, and the regional representative council (DPD) itself.
Ultimately, every proposal for structural change in governance requires scrutiny that goes beyond mere rhetorical feasibility or the division of power among political elites.
From the perspective of legal philosophy and constitutional morality, U.S. political philosopher John Rawls, in his work A Theory of Justice (1971), emphasizes that a just institutional order is based on basic principles that apply universally and equally to all parties, without allowing for special privileges or manipulation of rules for unilateral interests.
When justifications for practical utility, such as sharing the burden of regional oversight, are used as a pretext for violating constitutional certainty without careful systemic review, what emerges is not a realization of substantive justice but rather institutional pragmatism that blurs the lines of state accountability.
Therefore, national energy in responding to the current vacancy of the vice presidential seat should be directed toward fulfilling the available constitutional mechanisms transparently and accountably while allowing any proposals for changes to the fundamental structure of the state to undergo clear public deliberation free from transient interests.