Garibaldi Is Free, But What Are the Real Costs?

Second, retrofit estimates. According to Tempo, the Ministry of Defense cited an estimated ceiling of around Rp 7.2 trillion in February 2026 and approximately Rp 7.5 trillion on September 18.

According to House Commission I member TB Hasanuddin, as reported by Kompas.com (7/20/2026), retrofit could reach between Rp 7.2 trillion and Rp 16.8 trillion depending on requested specifications; AP quoted the upper bound—around Rp 16 trillion (900 million US dollars).

On September 8, according to Jawa Pos, the Ministry of Defense stated the Rp 7 trillion to Rp 16 trillion range was “unconfirmed.”

Third, final costs. As far as published, those numbers do not exist yet: PT PAL and Fincantieri are yet to assess the ship, weapons systems will be installed under presidential instruction, and propulsion system replacement is under study.

Therefore, the Rp 16 trillion is better understood as the upper limit of one specification scenario from a legislator, not an official cost.

Behind these figures are components that must be counted individually: engines and generators, electrical systems, radar and communication, structure, aviation and elevator systems, pipes and pumps, safety systems, spare parts, crew training, fuel, maintenance, and base operations.

The Indonesian Navy is preparing Lanal Lampung as one base and about 400 crew members; cost details have yet to be found by the author.

This is where total cost of ownership becomes the right measure: all expenses from acquisition to disposal.

The Ministry of Defense states a life cycle cost approach is used; the public awaits the figures. The key question: how much will Indonesia need to spend over 15–20 years, not just for initial retrofit?

The timeframe is still an assumption. The Navy Chief of Staff hopes the ship can be used for another 15–20 years; TB Hasanuddin estimates a remaining lifespan of about 10 years.

A Jakarta Defence Society analyst reminds that 15–20 years equals three to four presidential terms, meaning budget commitments must extend beyond one administration.

One more often overlooked factor: the scrapping costs avoided by Italy do not disappear. At the end of the ship’s life, similar costs will become the owner’s responsibility.

More than Just a Warship: What Does Indonesia Really Need?

This need is real. Indonesia is an archipelagic country repeatedly struck by earthquakes, tsunamis, floods, and forest fires.

According to AP, President Prabowo said the ship will be converted into a helicopter and drone carrier to assist disaster management, including fighting forest and land fires.

The Navy Chief of Staff mentioned the need for a platform capable of carrying many helicopters to deliver logistics to remote areas, prioritizing military operations other than war.

The Ministry of Defense added humanitarian logistics support and disaster relief. Officials cited capacities ranging from 10 to 18 helicopters, depending on size and configuration.

It’s also important to clarify what Garibaldi actually is. It is a light aircraft carrier about 180 meters long with a full load of around 14,000 tons, designed for helicopters and short takeoff/vertical landing aircraft like the Harrier—not a catapult-equipped carrier launching conventional fighter jets.

The valuable functions do not automatically justify such a large platform. Can the same functions be achieved through LPDs, hospital ships, logistics ships, multipurpose ships, amphibious ships, new ships, or a combination?

Garibaldi’s argument is it provides a single hull with deck and hangar for numerous helicopters and drones, and serves as a mobile command center, unlike the Navy’s hospital ship, which according to PT PAL has deck space for two helicopters.

However, disasters spread over many locations while a single aircraft carrier can only be in one place at a time.

Which option delivers more value per rupiah can be tested with mission data; it should not be answered by assumptions, whether from admirers or skeptics.