The Price of Prabowo's Consolidation

PSI politicians seem to have read the same situation. Raja Juli claims he wants to work full-time supporting the President as the Minister of Forestry.

This reasoning is understandable, but the timing is hard to detach from context. As sentiments toward Jokowi worsen, distancing oneself from the party led by his son is the safest move.

Then, could Prabowo also be implicated in the demands for Gibran's impeachment as Vice President? The answer, at least for now, is almost certainly no.

Our constitution does not provide a route for the impeachment of a president merely due to unpopularity. Article 7A of the 1945 Constitution demands specific legal reasons: treason against the state, corruption, bribery, other serious crimes, disgraceful acts, or failure to meet the requirements to remain president.

Here is where the fates of Gibran and Prabowo diverge. Gibran has a clear legal loophole. The Supreme Court's ruling regarding his equality certificate provides a basis for the phrase "no longer meet the requirements," and the DPR has begun to roll out the right to express opinions.

Prabowo does not have a similar loophole. Public dissatisfaction, no matter how deep, is not a constitutional reason.

The pathway is layered and steep. According to Article 7B, any DPR proposal must be approved by two-thirds of the members present in a plenary session attended by at least two-thirds of the members.

The Constitutional Court would then test this before the MPR decides with a quorum of three-quarters and a two-thirds majority of the present members.

With the coalition holding a substantial majority in parliament, that door will only open if the coalition fractures, and so far, there are no signs of that. On paper, Prabowo is indeed untouchable.

When the Shield Disappears

However, being untouchable on paper does not equate to being strong in the public's eye. The dissatisfaction is real, and its slope is steep.

Poltracking records that satisfaction with the government dropped from 78.1 percent in October 2025 to 55.1 percent in August 2026.

SMRC detects an even steeper decline, from 81.2 percent in November 2025 to 51.1 percent in July 2026. While a majority still expresses satisfaction, the wind direction has shifted.

Over the last two years, public disappointment has almost always found another target. Whenever a policy stalls, the finger points easily toward "Jokowi's people,” toward dual loyalties within the cabinet, or what is often referred to as "the Solo Gang."

Jokowi's shadows operated like a shield, absorbing some of the anger before it reached the President's desk.

This is the rarely calculated price of consolidation. Once Jokowi’s ties are severed, that point of blame disappears as well.