Judging Nominations After Inauguration

ERRORS in nomination may be discovered after inauguration. However, is that discovery sufficient to terminate a constitutional office?

Two court rulings regarding Gibran Rakabuming Raka's educational documents illustrate the complexity of distinguishing administrative corrections from the termination of authority.

The Constitutional Court ruling No. 01/PHPU.PRES-XXIV/2026 and the Supreme Court ruling No. 742 K/TUN/2026 place this issue within two different legal domains.

The Constitutional Court (MK) examines objections to nomination requirements, while the Supreme Court (MA) tests the validity of the equivalency certificate issued by the government.

Both found issues regarding the evidentiary basis of educational administration. However, neither ruling removed Gibran from his position as vice president.

Herein lies the legal tension. Administrative errors must not be overlooked just because the official has been inaugurated.

Conversely, a constitutional office cannot be terminated through the extended legal consequences of a ruling that addresses a different object.

A rule of law must be bold enough to correct mistakes without losing discipline regarding the limits of authority.

Dispute

In ruling No. 01/PHPU.PRES-XXIV/2026, the MK examined a petition questioning Gibran's fulfillment of educational requirements when he was a candidate for vice president in the 2024 election.

The examination included statements from electoral organizers, educational authorities, experts, witnesses, and supporting documents.

On pages 372–375, the MK stated that it found no convincing evidence in the form of diplomas, certificates, or foreign educational degrees that could serve as a basis for equivalency with upper secondary education or its equivalent.

The Court distinguished between a certificate of attendance, which indicates presence in educational processes, and documents that prove graduation.

The MK also emphasized that the assessment of equivalent knowledge is not identical to evidence of completion of educational levels.

This distinction is crucial, as Article 169 letter r of the Election Law mandates that presidential and vice-presidential candidates must have at least completed upper secondary education or its equivalent.

However, findings in the considerations did not lead to disqualification.

The MK stated that the status of the vice-presidential candidate ended after the inauguration on October 20, 2024.

The dispute regarding candidacy was no longer appropriately resolved through the election result dispute mechanism. The Court also stated that the petitioners do not have legal standing.

The ruling declared the petition unacceptable.

The distinction between considerations and rulings becomes very important. The MK did not definitively rule that Gibran lacked all required educational qualifications.

The Court stated it did not find convincing evidence in the examination of the case.

That finding has legal significance but should not be extended to a ruling of dismissal that was never issued.

The matter continued through the MA ruling No. 742 K/TUN/2026, decided on October 30, 2026.

The MA annulled the Certificate from the Director General of Primary and Secondary Education No. 9149/D.D1/KS/2019 dated August 6, 2019, and ordered the issuing official to revoke it.

The Court deemed the issuance of the equivalency certificate unsupported by adequate graduation evidence.

This situation was seen as contrary to the principle of diligence in government administration.

This ruling has clear administrative consequences. The certificate, which was the subject of the dispute, loses its validity based on the court's ruling.

However, the equivalency certificate is not a diploma.

A diploma proves the completion of education. An equivalency certificate is an administrative product that explains the equivalence of educational qualifications based on applicable provisions.

Therefore, the cancellation of the equivalency certificate does not equate to the cancellation of a diploma.

The MA also did not annul the KPU's decision regarding the determination of the candidates, the election results, or the inauguration of the vice president.

However, the annulment of the certificate should not be seen as a trivial matter. The insufficiency of graduation evidence that served as its basis touches on substantive issues.

The legal question then shifts: does the defect in the administrative decision simultaneously prove that the educational requirements were not fulfilled at the time of candidacy?

The answer requires separate examination.

If the original diploma is subsequently submitted, its authenticity, date of issuance, educational level, and compliance with candidacy requirements must be evaluated.

That document does not automatically revive the annulled certificate but could serve as relevant evidence in the appropriate legal process.

Defect

In administrative law, the validity of government decisions relates to authority, procedures, and substance.

This criterion is reflected in Law No. 30 of 2014 on Government Administration.

Procedural errors concern the manner of issuing decisions. Authority defects occur when actions are taken by unauthorized officials.

Meanwhile, substantive defects relate to the content of decisions or factual bases that do not meet legal requirements.

In Gibran's educational equivalency case, the issue does not stop at ordinary administrative deficiencies.

The considerations of MK and MA touched on the sufficiency of graduation evidence. This means there is a question regarding the veracity of the factual basis used to issue the decision.

However, there is a difference between the absence of convincing evidence in an examination and proving that someone does not possess the required educational qualifications at all.

This difference determines legal consequences.

An official's error in issuing a certificate may lead to obligations for revocation and administrative accountability.

On the other hand, non-fulfillment of position requirements requires proof regarding the legal status of the individual occupying that position.

The two may be related but cannot be equated without adequate examination.

Here, the principle of diligence must apply in both directions. The government must be diligent in issuing decisions. Courts and state institutions must also be diligent in determining legal consequences.

Administrative errors must not be minimized to mere formalities. However, their consequences must not be exaggerated beyond what can be proved.

Interpretation

The most pivotal issue lies in Article 7A of the 1945 Constitution.

The Constitution stipulates that the president and/or vice president may be dismissed if proven to violate certain laws, engage in disgraceful conduct, or are proven to no longer meet the criteria as president and/or vice president.

The phrase “no longer meets the criteria” opens a debate regarding the relationship between candidacy requirements and the continuation of office.

Grammatically, the word “no longer” implies a change in state. Requirements that were previously fulfilled may no longer be met when a person is in office.

However, what if a fact emerges post-inauguration that indicates a requirement was never met from the start?

An overly narrow interpretation could render the inauguration a protection against non-fulfillment of fundamental conditions.

Conversely, an overly broad interpretation could transform impeachment into a means to reopen every candidacy dispute.

Both Are Problematic

Article 7A must be read alongside Article 6 regarding position requirements and Article 7B regarding dismissal procedures.

This systematic reading shows that the Constitution distinguishes the process of obtaining a position from the mechanism of terminating it.

In the author's view, facts originating from the candidacy period can be relevant in the examination of dismissal.

However, that relevance does not mean every defect in candidacy automatically becomes grounds for impeachment.

It must be proven that the challenged requirements are legal requirements for the position, their non-fulfillment is substantive in nature, and that such matters fall within the grounds for dismissal in Article 7A.

Even after these three factors have been examined, the interpretation of the phrase “no longer” must still be answered in a constitutional way.

Thus, the ruling to annul the certificate cannot replace the proof regarding grounds for dismissal.

Impeachment is not a mechanism for appealing against administrative disputes over candidacy.

Authority

These two rulings also raise questions regarding the limits of judicial authority.

In ruling No. 01/PHPU.PRES-XXIV/2026, the MK considered the existence of special circumstances and the principle of ius curia novit to examine issues submitted after the deadline for resolving election result disputes.

The Court then stated that objections regarding the deadline were unfounded, but still maintained the limitation of the petitioner's legal standing.

The result is intriguing. Substantive issues were examined, while the petition ended with a dismissal ruling.

Next, the MA used the MK's ruling as one of the considerations in adjudicating the equivalency certificate.

The Court developed corrective and remedial administrative judicial authority while prioritizing substantive justice when setting aside objections related to the expiration of lawsuits and insufficient parties.

This consideration warrants critical examination.

Substantive justice is an important goal of the judiciary. However, it does not automatically justify the circumvention of legal procedural provisions without a legitimate basis for exceptions.

Time limits, the legal standing of the complainant, and court competence are not mere formalities.

All three restrict judicial authority while protecting the certainty of legal relationships.

The principle of ius curia novit obligates judges to know and discover the law. This principle does not mean that judges can create new authority outside the provisions of the Constitution and laws.

Such criticism does not diminish the obligation to respect court rulings.

In fact, rulings involving significant constitutional interests require open argumentation to academic scrutiny.

In the context of dismissing a vice president, Article 7B has established mechanisms involving the DPR, MK, and MPR.

The DPR submits opinions regarding alleged grounds for dismissal.

The MK examines and decides on those opinions. If the DPR's opinion is justified, the MPR makes a decision according to constitutional requirements.

The MA's ruling could serve as relevant evidence. The MK's considerations in election result dispute cases could also be subject to examination.

However, neither replaces a separate examination of grounds for dismissal.

There should be no leaps of authority simply because an issue draws national political attention.

State

The issue surrounding Gibran's educational documents ultimately tests Indonesia's consistency as a rule of law.

The court's finding regarding inadequate evidence of graduation as the basis for equivalency is a serious matter.

This finding should be followed up by the competent authorities and not overlooked simply because an individual holds a high office.

However, the continuation of a constitutional office cannot solely be determined through the annulment of administrative decisions related to candidacy.

There is a difference between rectifying government mistakes, assessing the fulfillment of educational requirements, and dismissing a vice president.

Each issue has its own legal basis, proof requirements, and resolution mechanisms.

Inauguration does not erase legal responsibilities. But voter mandates should not lose protection merely because the consequences of a ruling are extended beyond the objects it adjudicates.

The law must be able to uphold both.

If there is evidence that position requirements are unfulfilled, constitutional mechanisms must operate.

Conversely, if the issue is merely a defect in issuing decisions, the consequences must be placed within the administrative law sphere.

This stance does not defend an official. Nor does it reject accountability demands.

This is about ensuring that state authority is not used beyond its limits.

Certificates can be annulled. Errors can be rectified. Officials can be dismissed. However, each has its own reasons, metrics, and legal pathways.

A rule of law does not lose its authority when it rejects shortcuts.

Rather, this is where its dignity is tested: having the courage to correct mistakes without turning every dispute into a power grab.