Interpreting the Word "Or" in the Constitution

Interpretation

The Court's decision does not automatically close all avenues for regulation by lawmakers.

The Court acknowledges that the number of candidate pairs could become very high if each participating party proposes its own pair.

In a multiparty system, this possibility deserves consideration. Elections should offer choices that voters can truly understand, not simply a long list of names.

However, this recognition of practical issues accompanies limits. The Court affirms that all participating parties have the right to propose candidate pairs.

Proposals cannot be based on the percentage of DPR seats or national votes. Parties can merge, provided that such mergers do not lead to dominance that narrows candidate options and voter choices.

The Court also calls for meaningful participation in changes to the election law, including from parties without seats in the DPR.

This guideline must be read as a unity. The sentence allowing for restructuring the number of candidates cannot be separated from the recognition of the rights of every participating party.

Similarly, the freedom to form coalitions should not be interpreted as a requirement to form coalitions. In constitutional law, legitimate political choices are not automatically translatable into legal requirements.

What if the law later establishes that a candidate pair must be supported by at least two parties? The direct consequence is easily seen.

An election-participating party wishing to nominate its own pair cannot do so.

It must seek approval from another party. The right granted to it by the constitution becomes contingent upon the will of a second party.

This dependency is not mere formality. Two parties may disagree about the vice-presidential candidate or the direction of the program.

If an agreement fails, the first party loses the opportunity to make a nomination, even if it has met the requirements as an electoral participant.

It may well be that every party eventually finds a partner. However, political possibility does not replace legal guarantee.

If a new right can only be exercised after another party agrees, the authority of the proposer becomes a mandatory joint authority.

This minimum condition of two parties thus faces serious constitutional objections. The Court has yet to adjudicate such a formulation; this is an evaluation of the proposal.

This objection can be sharpened using Robert Alexy’s proportionality framework: does the coalition obligation align with the goal of structuring the number of candidates, is there a less burdensome way, and do the benefits correspond with the rights that are restricted?

However, this test does not give permission to entirely bargain away alternatives that are clearly available in Article 6A.

Before weighing the pros and cons of restrictions, lawmakers must answer whether they are entitled to close the route for proposals by a single party. Alexy offers general analysis tools, not opinions on Indonesian discourse.

Limits

The proposal to limit coalitions to a maximum of four parties requires a different examination.

The Court’s decision indeed reminds that coalitions should not become means of dominance that constrict voter choice.

If nearly all parties rally behind a single pair, direct elections lose some of their competitiveness. The interest in preventing such situations deserves consideration.

However, the figure of four is not an automatic consequence of the ruling. Why four, and not three or five?

What if the number of election participants changes? That question demands justification and simulation.

Coalition limits must also not negate the possibility of parties proposing their own pairs.

Here, lawmakers must distinguish between the right to propose, the requirements for nominees, and the registration procedures.