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This article was translated by AI. Read the original article on Kompas.com. See Original
Threshold for presidential candidacy seems not to have truly vanished. After the Constitutional Court struck down the provision that for years required a party or coalition to hold at least 20 percent of DPR seats or secure 25 percent of the valid national vote to nominate a president, a new idea has surfaced: the presidential and vice-presidential candidate pair must be supported by at least two factions in the DPR.
This idea was introduced publicly by NasDem Party Chairman Surya Paloh on September 19, 2026.
Paloh admitted hearing proposals for a minimum support of two factions. He considered this idea positive and fundamentally similar to the previous threshold, especially if the parliamentary threshold is set high.
At the same time, NasDem proposed a 7 percent parliamentary threshold.
This statement deserves to be read as more than just political talk ahead of discussions on revising the Election Law. It contains a new design for presidential candidacy.
Instead of using a percentage of seats or votes, it uses the number of factions. The number disappears, but the restriction remains.
Of course, so far there is no official formulation to review article by article. It is still unknown who originally proposed this, whether two factions would be an absolute requirement, and how parties without DPR seats would be treated.
Therefore, this idea is not yet worthy of being treated as a political decision. However, before becoming formalized into a norm, its constitutional risks must be clearly discussed.
The Constitutional Court Ruling No. 62/PUU-XXII/2024 marked an important change in Indonesian election law.
On January 2, 2025, the Court declared Article 222 of the Election Law inconsistent with the 1945 Constitution and without binding legal force.
This provision previously required that nominating parties or coalitions hold at least 20 percent of DPR seats or gain 25 percent of the valid national vote in the previous DPR election.
The Court did not just strike down the numbers. It dismantled the mindset that placed presidential nominations under the control of a few major parties.
In its legal considerations, the Court noted that the threshold narrowed the choices of candidate pairs, encouraged domination by parties or coalitions, and made presidential elections prone to having only two candidate pairs.
If this trend continued, the Court warned of the possibility of a single candidate running.
Experience shows that simplifying choices does not always bring stability. It can also intensify polarization.
The Court then provided constitutional guidelines in its reasoning for legislators.
All political parties participating in the election have the right to propose candidate pairs. Proposals should no longer be based on percentages of DPR seats or valid national votes.
Parties may still unite, but coalition engineering should not create dominance that limits voter choices.
This approach aligns with the text of Article 6A Paragraph (2) of the 1945 Constitution: presidential and vice-presidential candidate pairs are proposed by political parties or coalitions participating in the general election before the general election is held.
Textually, the constitution provides two possibilities. Parties can propose candidates alone or together with others. The word "or" should not be quietly removed by legislation.
If support from two factions is made an absolute requirement, the fence struck down by the Court will be rebuilt.
The form may differ. Previously, that fence was built from percentages; later, it might be based on factions.
However, for parties left outside, the material difference does not change the fact that the candidacy door remains closed.
The first problem lies in using factions. Political parties and factions are not interchangeable terms.
Political parties are election participants. Factions are groupings of members within the DPR to optimize the performance of the representative institution's functions.