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Guarding the Republic from Overly Close Power

20 November 2026, 07:50 WIB
Jannus TH Siahaan,
Sandro Gatra

Tim Redaksi

This article was translated by AI. Read the original article on Kompas.com. See Original

IN 31 A.D., Lucius Aelius Sejanus, the head of the Roman Praetorian Guard, was at the height of his power.

He was not the emperor, but his proximity to Tiberius, control over the emperor's guard, and his network among elites made his name almost inseparable from the center of power.

The writer Tacitus noted how Sejanus gradually secured the emperor's trust, to the point where his influence exceeded the boundaries of the position he originally held.

However, when his ambitions began to be perceived as a threat, his downfall was swift and severe.

The story of Sejanus is not merely a palace drama, but a political paradox that continues to repeat today where individuals can wield significant influence without holding the highest office, while institutions surrounding the ruler gradually depend on the same access and intermediaries.

In such situations, the formal center of power appears intact, but the path to decision-making becomes concentrated within a narrow circle.

The history of Russia at the end of the Romanov Dynasty also provides another perspective. Grigori Rasputin was very close to the family of Nicholas II after being entrusted with the health of the heir, Alexei.

This closeness fostered the perception that an advisor without a government position had sway over palace affairs.

Historians remind us that Rasputin's influence on state decisions was often exaggerated by opponents of the monarchy.

Nevertheless, the perception of his closeness ultimately eroded trust in the imperial family, especially as Russia faced war and political crises.

These two stories cannot simply be equated with today's politics in Indonesia. Rome was an empire, Russia was a monarchy at the time, while Indonesia is a constitutional republic with elections, a parliament, and a fairly clear division of powers.

However, history provides a relevant warning: when personal relationships become the main pathway to public decisions, the boundary between legitimate influence and unchecked power can become very blurred.

This issue is crucial to discuss as the public space deliberates who might occupy high state positions.

Thus, debates should not stop at closeness to the president, contributions in the political struggle, or the ability to manage coalitions.

Constitutional positions carry responsibilities far beyond personal relationships. Therefore, it is necessary to ensure not only who is trusted by the leader but also how power will be limited, monitored, and held accountable.

Political science recognizes the distinction between formal and informal institutions. The constitution, laws, and bureaucratic structures form the official rules.

Beyond that, there exist networks of trust, habits, patronage, and unwritten agreements (conventions) that help determine who gains access and how decisions are made.

Gretchen Helmke and Steven Levitsky, in “Informal Institutions and Democracy” (2006), demonstrate that informal rules do not always undermine democracy.

Informal institutions can complement formal rules, but they can also compete with or even replace them when official institutions are weak.

In politics, informal influence is not uncommon. Every president has advisors, party liaisons, coalition managers, and trusted confidants.

Problems arise when personal access becomes more decisive than procedure, or when public institutions are seen as mere extensions of a political figure's network.

At this point, questions of power shift from who holds office to who can influence decisions without having to justify their authority to the public.

In this context, the term “manipulator” should be understood analytically, not as a label for certain individuals.

Political operators can perform legitimate functions such as conveying aspirations, negotiating support, or ensuring inter-institutional communication. These roles can even help the government function.

However, the role of intermediary differs from decision-making authority. When that boundary is unclear, formal officials risk merely endorsing decisions made elsewhere, while the public struggles to determine who should be held accountable.

Max Weber helps to unpack this issue through the concept of legal-rational authority. In modern states, authority should reside in positions and rules, not in personal relationships with powerful figures.

Conversely, patrimonial patterns emerge when loyalty to individuals and personal relationships determine the management of public affairs.

The boundaries between the two are not always black and white, but the further decisions shift from procedures toward personal closeness, the greater the risk of institutional dependence on individuals.

Therefore, the idea of “institutional distance” becomes important. This distance does not mean the president must distance themselves from their advisors or supporting parties.

It means that every decision should return to legal foundations, verifiable procedures, and officials who are formally responsible.

Parliaments must be able to oversee the government, courts must render decisions independently, and law enforcement must operate based on the law.

Without such safeguards, personal connections that initially assist coordination can transform into paths of influence that are difficult to monitor.

Next, we turn to loyalty. Loyalty is a crucial element in politics. Parties need trusted cadres, presidents need aides who are aligned with them, and coalitions require the ability to maintain agreements.

However, political loyalty does not automatically become a measure of competency for every public position.

Acknowledgment of political contributions is different from the mandate to exercise public authority. The former resides within the logic of organizations and coalitions, while the latter must adhere to the interests of citizens, laws, and the constitution.

Edward Aspinall and Ward Berenschot, in “Democracy for Sale: Elections, Clientelism, and the State in Indonesia” (2019), demonstrate how informal networks, patronage exchanges, and access to resources shape Indonesia's post-Reformasi political practices.

Research from UGM through PolGov and KITLV on the 2024 regional elections also reveals the material dimensions of this issue.

Based on a survey of 478 candidates in 10 provinces, the average expenditure of the local head candidates surveyed reached IDR 36.8 billion.

The report also estimates the national spending for vote-buying at IDR 12.9 trillion and political dowries around IDR 9.4 trillion.

These figures do not prove that every political relationship is built through transactions, let alone evidence regarding specific individuals. However, the findings highlight the significant material incentives in electoral competition.

When political costs are high, dependency on funders, support networks, and power intermediaries can become greatly reinforced.

Thus, filling public positions must be distanced from the logic of reciprocating favors or sharing influence. The state is not a company distributing shares to those who financed its victory.

Rasputin illustrates another danger, not just influence, but also public perception of that influence.

In times of war and crisis, his closeness to Alexandra and news of his interference in palace affairs damaged the monarchy's reputation.

However, this story needs to be read carefully. Some historians argue that Rasputin's influence on Nicholas II's policies was more limited than popular opinion suggests, while the circulating rumors became part of the crisis of legitimacy.

In other words, a government can lose trust not only due to erroneous decisions but also because the public no longer understands who is truly making decisions.

A more institutional comparison is seen in Cardinal Richelieu, Chief Minister to Louis XIII in France.

Richelieu wielded extraordinary influence, but he exercised it through office and the structures of the royal government.

Historians continue to debate how much control he had over the king, but his story reminds us that significant influence needs to be viewed alongside the forms of authority and the mechanisms that support it.

The issue is not simply the strength or weakness of an advisor, but whether that power has a basis that can be recognized and held accountable.

In Indonesia, the vice president has a constitutional position. Article 4, paragraph (2) of the 1945 Constitution states that the president is assisted by a vice president, while Article 8 regulates the role of the vice president when the president resigns, is dismissed, or is unable to perform their duties.

Therefore, the vice president is not merely a coalition symbol or a reward for political services. This position is part of the design for government continuity and carries significant public responsibility.

In a presidential democracy, the vice president also holds a unique position. They are elected alongside the president through elections, gaining their own electoral legitimacy as part of the elected pair.

At the same time, their daily duties are significantly influenced by the division of labor with the president.

Consequently, the public ought to be informed not only about the political reasons behind selecting someone but also about perspectives regarding constitutional roles, ethical responsibilities, and commitments to upholding institutional functions.

Such openness enriches the debate without transforming it into personal judgments.

Concerns regarding the concentration of influence are not merely abstract debates. The World Justice Project's “Rule of Law Index 2026” ranks Indonesia 75th out of 143 countries, with an overall score of 0.51.

Indonesia's score for limiting government power is recorded at 0.60, while the absence of corruption is at 0.42 and the criminal justice system at 0.37.

Freedom House, in “Freedom in the World 2026,” gives Indonesia a score of 56 out of 100 and the status of “Partly Free.”

These indexes do not evaluate specific candidates but illustrate why oversight, transparency, and institutional independence remain crucial tasks.

Marcus Mietzner, in his study “Elite Collusion in Indonesia” (2025), explains how elite collusion can facilitate the expansion of executive power while sometimes limiting those ambitions.

His analysis reminds us that democracy is not solely determined by elections but also by the willingness of elites to uphold power boundaries and maintain space for correction.

Ultimately, democracy need not suspect every confidant of rulers, political operators, or coalition managers. They are part of political life.

However, when informal influence seeks to transition into constitutional roles, the public has the right to demand clearer standards, such as capacity, integrity, openness, and a commitment to oversight mechanisms.

Proximity to leaders may explain how someone gains trust. However, that proximity alone does not adequately explain how one will account for power.

A modern state stands on rules, not friendship circles. A leader may have trusted confidants, but state institutions must not belong to that circle of trust.

Because, in a republic, the throne is not a place to validate personal contributions, but a pure constitutional mandate, and anyone approaching it must be ready to submit to the same boundaries, namely the law, oversight, and public interests.

Ultimately, loyalty may lead someone to the gates of power, but only humility to be constrained is worthy of bringing them inside.

In a republic, the most dangerous individuals are not those who seek power but those who are already too powerful to be rejected, too close to be monitored, and too deserving to be criticized.



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