Shameless Politics: Abandoning Allies, Maintaining Power

IN Indonesian politics, loyalty often lasts until interests change.

The resignation of Gibran Rakabuming Raka from the vice presidential position, as reported on November 12, 2026, brings an interesting political irony.

Gibran has lost support, but the government coalition remains intact.

Parties are beginning to distance themselves from a figure, without displaying the same desire to abandon power.

This event raises fundamental questions about the nature of political coalitions in Indonesia.

Is party loyalty based on solidarity, shared ideology, and commitment to a common agenda, or is it more determined by calculations of interest and access to power?

Gibran's resignation illustrates that in Indonesian politics, loyalty to a figure can end when its strategic value changes, while relationships with power remain intact.

Gibran Abandoned, Power Maintained

Gibran holds strategic value in the political landscape ahead of the 2024 elections.

His presence is part of a political compromise between Prabowo Subianto and the power network of Joko Widodo.

Gibran also brings electoral advantages through Jokowi's popularity, which can be explained using the concept of coattail effect, namely the electoral impact of a figure on candidates or parties benefiting from their popularity.

However, the strategic value of a political actor is not permanent.

After Prabowo won the presidential election and took control of the government, the political center of gravity shifted.

The president becomes the key holder of resources in power distribution, while the need to maintain symbolic ties with Jokowi no longer holds the same weight as during the electoral contest.

In this configuration, Gibran faces a change in position.

His political value as a link between Prabowo and Jokowi is likely to diminish when Prabowo gains electoral legitimacy and control over the executive institutions.

Support for Gibran, previously part of a political compromise, can become a burden as controversies arise and the costs of maintaining him increase.

Parties then have a relatively straightforward choice.

They can distance themselves from Gibran without leaving Prabowo's government.

Calculatively, this strategy offers a dual advantage.

Parties can avoid reputational risks due to a controversial figure while also maintaining access to power, positions, and political resources.

Here, the transactional nature of Indonesian coalitions becomes apparent. Political solidarity does not always bind actors.

When interests change, commitments to individuals can be revoked, while relationships with the power center remain intact.

Gibran exemplifies that in elite politics, a person can be an asset when needed and turn into a burden when interests shift.

Loyalty is not something permanent; it is part of a political calculation that is constantly updated.

Party Cartelization and the Weakening of the Opposition

This phenomenon is inseparable from the tendency toward party cartelization in Indonesian politics.

Dan Slater, in his study of Indonesian politics, explains how parties can build wide coalitions to access and maintain state power.

Electoral competition continues, but the line between government and opposition becomes increasingly blurred as almost all political forces have an interest in joining the government.

In a cartel configuration, parties do not have to maintain ideological consistency after elections. Competition can shift to power access distribution.

A party that previously criticized the government can join the cabinet, while a party that was part of the coalition can distance itself from specific individuals without changing its political orientation toward the government.

Gibran's resignation highlights this mechanism. Parties can abandon a figure without leaving the power structure that supports them.

They do not need to build an alternative government, formulate an opposition agenda, or offer programmatic contradictions against Prabowo.

What is needed is simply to adjust their positions to changing political interests.

The consequence is a structural weakening of the opposition. The opposition does not always die because it has been silenced or formally banned.

It can also weaken when parties lose their incentives to stay outside the government.

When access to power is more beneficial than political consistency, opposition becomes a costly and less attractive position for party elites.

Democracy ultimately faces a paradoxical situation. Elections continue, parties compete, and changes in figures occur.

However, this competition does not always evolve into meaningful battles of ideas, programs, and substantial policy alternatives.

Procedural democracy persists, while competitive democracy loses its political depth.

When nearly all parties have an interest in the government, who will oversee power?

Who consistently questions presidential policies? Who offers alternatives when the government makes mistakes?

A healthy opposition is not just a group without cabinet seats.

The opposition needs political courage, ideological consistency, and the ability to build alternative agendas.

Without that, democracy risks becoming an elite negotiation arena, trading positions and influence without presenting meaningful political competition to society.

When Loyalty is No Longer a Political Principle

Gibran's resignation also has the potential to change the power dynamic between Prabowo and Jokowi.

While in government, Gibran could have been one of the institutional channels for Jokowi's political influence.

Loss of this position may narrow Jokowi's access to the government, although it does not automatically eliminate his popularity, network, and political capacity.

For Prabowo, this situation may strengthen the consolidation of power.

The coalition that persists despite Gibran losing support shows that party loyalty is more tied to sustaining government access than solidarity with a specific figure.

However, presidential power consolidation is not synonymous with strengthening democracy.

The more fundamental issue lies in the consequences for Indonesian democracy.

If Gibran's positional change does not spur changes in coalition structure, then the turnover of political actors does not lead to significant changes in the power configuration.

Elites can abandon one another, renegotiate, and form new compromises without necessarily fostering healthier political competition.

When Jokowi Leaves PDI Perjuangan

This phenomenon indeed has a precedent not far from Jokowi's own political experience.

Jokowi built his political career through PDI Perjuangan, gaining organizational support, networks, and party legitimacy until he became president.

However, that relationship fractured when political interests heading into the 2024 election were no longer aligned.

Jokowi then distanced himself from the party that raised his political career and built a different support configuration.

Of course, Jokowi's experience and Gibran's situation are not entirely identical. Jokowi is a political actor with much larger popularity, networks, and electoral mobilization capacity.

Gibran occupies a different institutional position.

However, both illustrate how political relationships can shift when interests no longer converge.

Jokowi leaves PDI Perjuangan, Gibran is abandoned by the coalition, yet the parties maintain access to power.

Here lies the political irony of Indonesia becoming increasingly evident.

The history of solidarity, personal closeness, and organizational relations does not always outweigh elite interest calculations.

Political loyalty can end when interests change.

The issue for democracy is when the interest in maintaining power persists, while loyalty to ideologies, organizations, and political commitments becomes increasingly negotiable.

In such a situation, Indonesian democracy risks becoming an arena for elite turnover without a strong opposition, without consistent programmatic competition, and without guarantees that power is genuinely overseen.