The Rights of Persons with Disabilities, the Human Rights Bill, and State Accountability

“Rights are best understood as trumps over some background justification for political decisions.” - Ronald Dworkin (1977).

IN THE framework of a constitutional state, human rights (HAM) are not enough to be declared merely as moral recognition or political promises.

Rights must give rise to clear, enforceable state obligations that carry consequences if violated.

This perspective leads us to examine the provisions concerning persons with disabilities in the draft revision of the Human Rights Bill (RUU HAM) currently being deliberated.

Certain contents have sparked public criticism, notably regarding the insufficiency of substantive regulations and the unclear mechanisms for state accountability.

Still Minimalist Regulations

Indeed, the draft states that the rights of persons with disabilities are human rights.

Article 62 also guarantees the right to live independently, access appropriate accessibility and accommodations, and participate fully and effectively in all aspects of life.

However, this recognition remains minimalist and insufficient to construct a comprehensive human rights guarantee.

The issue is not the absence of recognition. Article 62 paragraph (2) leaves the implementation of those rights to subsidiary legislation.

But such phrasing raises fundamental questions: who bears the primary obligation, what standards must be met, how are violations determined, and through what mechanisms can persons with disabilities seek remedies?

This is where the weakness in norm formulation becomes a constitutional problem.

When laws merely mention rights without articulating measurable obligations, persons with disabilities inevitably depend on sectoral policies, administrative capacity, and the varying commitment of institutions.

As a result, rights that should be universally upheld risk becoming unevenly protected.

Yet, the principle of a constitutional state demands that the fulfillment of human rights not be left to chance or mere administrative goodwill.

More than that: there must be norms to serve as a basis to assess the actions and omissions of the state.