The Rights of Persons with Disabilities, the Human Rights Bill, and State Accountability

“Rights are best understood as trumps over some background justification for political decisions.” - Ronald Dworkin (1977).

IN THE framework of a constitutional state, human rights (HAM) are not enough to be declared merely as moral recognition or political promises.

Rights must give rise to clear, enforceable state obligations that carry consequences if violated.

This perspective leads us to examine the provisions concerning persons with disabilities in the draft revision of the Human Rights Bill (RUU HAM) currently being deliberated.

Certain contents have sparked public criticism, notably regarding the insufficiency of substantive regulations and the unclear mechanisms for state accountability.

Still Minimalist Regulations

Indeed, the draft states that the rights of persons with disabilities are human rights.

Article 62 also guarantees the right to live independently, access appropriate accessibility and accommodations, and participate fully and effectively in all aspects of life.

However, this recognition remains minimalist and insufficient to construct a comprehensive human rights guarantee.

The issue is not the absence of recognition. Article 62 paragraph (2) leaves the implementation of those rights to subsidiary legislation.

But such phrasing raises fundamental questions: who bears the primary obligation, what standards must be met, how are violations determined, and through what mechanisms can persons with disabilities seek remedies?

This is where the weakness in norm formulation becomes a constitutional problem.

When laws merely mention rights without articulating measurable obligations, persons with disabilities inevitably depend on sectoral policies, administrative capacity, and the varying commitment of institutions.

As a result, rights that should be universally upheld risk becoming unevenly protected.

Yet, the principle of a constitutional state demands that the fulfillment of human rights not be left to chance or mere administrative goodwill.

More than that: there must be norms to serve as a basis to assess the actions and omissions of the state.

Theoretically, norms recognizing rights should be accompanied by an obligation structure that makes those rights effective.

Rights without identifiable obligations risk becoming declarations that are difficult to enforce.

It is no surprise that public criticism has surfaced. PSHK and KontraS, for example, assess that several provisions remain abstract and fail to clearly specify the parties responsible for implementing, fulfilling, protecting, and guaranteeing the regulated rights (PSHK and KontraS, 2026).

The consequences are not merely technical or legislative. In daily life, rights lose meaning when someone cannot access public service buildings, obtain information in understandable formats, participate equally in court proceedings, or use digital services due to barriers unaddressed by the state. Here, the lack of accessibility and appropriate accommodation can turn into forms of discrimination.

The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), which Indonesia ratified through Law Number 19 of 2011, actually provides a complete and clear framework.

The Convention defines discrimination based on disability as actions that obstruct or deny equal enjoyment of rights, including refusal of reasonable accommodation.

Reasonable accommodation is understood as necessary modifications or adjustments in a particular circumstance, so long as they do not impose a disproportionate burden (United Nations, 2006).

Thus, accessibility should not be treated as an additional facility granted only when budgets or conditions allow. It is a prerequisite for enjoying rights equally.

Moreover, reasonable accommodation must not be positioned as an exception from general service standards.

Both are instruments to address barriers that factually prevent a person from enjoying their rights.

Undoubtedly, the RUU HAM needs to affirm this logic so equality does not stop at uniform treatment, which still results in exclusion.

This framework shows that equality does not always mean treating everyone the same way.

Substantive equality demands that the state recognize different barriers and take necessary actions so each individual can genuinely enjoy their rights.

Therefore, the mention of accessibility and reasonable accommodation in the RUU HAM should not merely revolve around general terms.

They need to be connected to concrete obligations of state institutions, public service providers, law enforcement officers, and even local governments.

State Accountability

More comprehensive regulations also need to cover legal capacity and access to justice.

CRPD emphasizes that persons with disabilities have legal capacity on an equal basis with others in all aspects of life and have the right to receive the support necessary to exercise that capacity (United Nations, 2006).

This principle is critical to ensure legal protection does not turn into unilateral decision-making on behalf of persons with disabilities. The state must build support and safeguards that respect the will, choices, and dignity of each individual.

This strengthening does not mean the RUU HAM should replicate all provisions in the Law on Persons with Disabilities.

Its important function lies in providing binding fundamental principles: every restriction of rights must be justifiable, every barrier must be addressed, and every violation must open access to remedies.

Without this construction, sectoral laws may continue alongside institutional practices that have yet to fully recognize persons with disabilities as equal legal subjects.

In this context, Law Number 8 of 2016 on Persons with Disabilities should not be seen as a reason to limit regulations in the RUU HAM.

The RUU HAM must ensure that the rights of persons with disabilities are connected to all civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights regimes, while providing interpretative principles for the creation and enforcement of subordinate regulations.

The revision of the Human Rights Law presents an opportunity to change the way the state views persons with disabilities: from a group merely mentioned in norms to legal subjects who have rights and can demand accountability.

Normative recognition is an important beginning. Unfortunately, it is not the end of constitutional obligations.

Genuine respect for the rights of persons with disabilities is not enough to be heard only in the language of laws.

Respect culminates in meaning when the law opens doors, provides support, removes barriers, and ultimately ensures every citizen stands equally before the state.