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Party Chair as Minister: DPR Oversight Bound

28 October 2026, 08:36 WIB
Taufiqurrohman Syahuri,
Tim Kompas.com

Tim Redaksi

This article was translated by AI. Read the original article on Kompas.com. See Original

DECISION The Constitutional Court's (MK) ruling regarding the educational requirements of Vice President Gibran Rakabuming Raka should not be seen as an ordinary matter that resolves simply with the gavel's strike.

There lies a much larger constitutional issue behind this decision: how can the state ensure that every finding and consideration of constitutional institutions is seriously followed up by governmental bodies that hold the authority?

In Decision Number 01/PHPU.PRES-XXIV/2026, the MK stated that it found no convincing evidence in the form of diplomas, certificates, or degrees from abroad that could serve as the basis for equating Gibran's education with the minimum requirement of senior high school or its equivalent as mandated by the Election Law.

However, the MK also stated that the request could not be accepted due to the legal standing of the petitioners, thus the Court did not annul or disqualify Gibran as Vice President.

This is where the constitutional issue becomes intriguing. The MK’s findings and considerations should not simply be treated as footnotes that can be ignored.

On the contrary, they should become material for the relevant state institutions to further examine the implications regarding the requirements of the Vice Presidential office.

The 1945 Constitution indeed provides a clear mechanism. Article 7A states that the President and/or Vice President can be dismissed if proven to no longer meet the requirements as President and/or Vice President.

Meanwhile, Article 7B stipulates that the DPR can propose a dismissal to the MPR after first requesting the MK to examine, adjudicate, and decide the DPR's opinion on the matter.

This means that the dismissal mechanism is not a shortcut to replacing state officials based on political pressure. It is a constitutional mechanism that has clear stages, proof, and institutions involved.

Therefore, if there are serious issues regarding the fulfillment of the Vice President’s requirements, the next public question should be directed at the DPR: what has the DPR done regarding these findings?

The DPR’s silence certainly raises questions, especially as members of the public, academics, senior professors, activists, veterans, and constituents have urged that this issue be followed up through constitutional mechanisms.

We should not hastily accuse the DPR of neglecting the constitution. However, we also cannot ignore the potential existence of structural issues in the relationship between political parties, the DPR, and the government.

Herein lies a more fundamental problem: the head of the political party can also serve as a minister in the President's cabinet.

In a presidential system, the DPR has three main functions: legislation, budgeting, and oversight. The logic is straightforward.

The government operates in the executive realm, while the DPR resides in the legislative realm, whose primary duty is to oversee the government.

However, how can oversight be maximized if the party leader, who is the political superior of DPR members, is also part of the government that needs to be overseen?

While formally, a party chairperson who becomes a minister does not automatically become the institutional superior of the DPR.

The DPR remains an independent state institution in exercising its authority. However, in practical politics, the structural relationship of parties cannot simply be separated from the political behavior of DPR members. This is where the potential for conflicts of interest emerges.

The President holds government power. Ministers are accountable to the President.

Simultaneously, the minister in question can be the party chair who has members in the DPR. These DPR members, politically, are situated within a party structure led by someone who is simultaneously part of the government.

This configuration creates serious issues for the principle of checks and balances. Not because the DPR is legally subordinate to the government, but because the lines of political loyalty can become more complicated than the division of powers envisioned by the constitution.

The triad of power developed by Montesquieu was fundamentally birthed from the need to prevent the concentration of power. Executive, legislative, and judicial powers are placed in positions that balance each other.

In a presidential system, this separation should yield effective oversight, not mere institutional separation on paper.

Indonesia does not adhere to an absolute separation of powers. Our system is one of power distribution with mechanisms for mutual oversight.

However, precisely because of this, the design of the relationship between political parties, the DPR, and the government must be safeguarded to prevent an excessive concentration of political influence.

The issue of the Vice President's educational requirements teaches an important lesson. When the DPR faces matters that potentially intersect with the interests of the government and supporting parties, the public has the right to question whether the oversight function is truly operating independently.

Therefore, the issue at hand is not simply whether the DPR should impeach the Vice President. That is a legal and constitutional question that must be answered through a mechanism of proof, not political opinion.

A more fundamental question is: does our political design sufficiently guarantee that the DPR can perform its oversight function freely when the leader of the party that oversees DPR members is part of the President's cabinet?

If the answer is no, then it is time for regulatory reconstruction.

Prohibiting DPR members from concurrently serving as ministers is already a reasonable principle so that the oversight function does not directly conflict with government functions.

However, the deeper issue lies in party leadership. A party chair is not just an ordinary government official; they have political influence over their party members in parliament.

Thus, it is worth considering rules that restrict or prohibit party chairpersons from concurrently serving as ministers in the cabinet. The goal is not to weaken political parties or diminish the President's right to form a cabinet, but to strengthen the independence of parliament.

Democracy is not enough to simply have institutions that are formally separated. Democracy requires institutions capable of exercising their authority without being shackled by political relationships.

Ultimately, this issue is not merely about Gibran. It is about the DPR. It is about the government. It is about political parties. Most importantly, it is about how the constitution functions in the face of political interests.

If we want checks and balances to operate earnestly, then the lines between overseeing power and the power being overseen must be drawn as clearly as possible.

Let it not be that the parliament is legally outside the government but politically finds itself overshadowed by the government.



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